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Ruiz v. Santa Maria: Defining "Minority-Preferred 
Candidate" Within Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act' was passed to address problems faced by 
ethnic minorities in gaining access to the electoral system,2 by protecting 
the minority's ability to "participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice."3 Section 2 of the Act was passed to pre-
vent vote dilution, which occurs when the majority subsumes the minor-
ity's vote in nearly all elections, giving the minority no opportunity to 
elect its chosen representatives.4 Following a United States Supreme 
Court decision in 1980,5 Congress amended Section 2 to give even 
. . . . 6 greater protectiOn to rmnontles. 
In Mobile v. Bolden,7 the Supreme Court held that, in order to estab-
lish a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs must show that the officials who set 
up a voting process or procedure intended to dilute the minority's vote.8 
This substantially raised the bar for plaintiffs further than Congress 
wished, as evidenced by the fact that two years later Section 2 was 
amended.9 The new language of Section 2 specifically indicated that a 
violating election system was one which resulted in discrimination, re-
gardless of any intent. 10 Therefore, plaintiffs who wished to bring a Sec-
Copyright © 2000 by Stephanie E. Ord. 
I. 42 U.S. C. § 1973 ( 1988). 
2. See Scott Yut, Comment, Using Candidate Race to Define Minority-Preferred Candi-
dates Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 571, 571. 
!d. 
At the time of passage few minorities had the money, resources, or opportunity to serve 
as candidates for elected office, and voting rules made it difficult for minorities to vote or 
elect their preferred candidate. Some states, counties, and cities, particularly in the South, 
created election rules and structured election districts to prevent minority citizens either 
from voting or from having a reasonable chance of electing a candidate of their choice. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). 
4. See id. 
5. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
6. See An Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to Extend the Effect of Certain 
Provisions, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-205,96 Stat. 134 (1982). 
7. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
8. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). 
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
10. See id. 
295 
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tion 2 claim were no longer precluded by their inability to prove dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the jurisdiction's officials. 
The Supreme Court's only comment on the revised Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act has been Thornburg v. Gingles ("Gingles"). 11 There 
the Court set out a three prong test for courts to use when evaluating vote 
dilution claims. 12 Unfortunately, the Court split on the issue of the proper 
definition of "minority-preferred candidate," leading to confusion among 
the lower courts. 
Part II of this note examines the Supreme Court opinion in Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, looks at the concurring opinions, and describes the split 
evident among the Circuit Courts of Appeals over the definition of "mi-
nority-preferred candidate." Part III sets out the facts, holdings, and 
analysis of Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria 13 , the Ninth Circuit's attempt to 
apply Thornburg v. Gingles. Part IV suggests why the approach accepted 
by the Ninth Circuit should be rejected in favor of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test outlined by the Third Circuit in Jenkins v. Red Clay 
Consolidated School District Board of Education. 14 
II. GINGLES AND THE RESULTING CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Supreme Court 
In Gingles, the Court established a three prong test to determine 
whether there has been a violation of Section 2, such that minorities are 
denied the opportunity to elect their "representatives of choice."15 How-
ever, the Court split on the role race should play when determining who 
is the "minority-preferred candidate," a term the Court uses in its test, 
thus leaving the lower courts with no precise definition. 16 The resulting 
confusion has led to a split among the circuit courts over the proper defi-
nition of "minority preferred candidate" to use in applying the Gingles 
test. 
The plaintiffs in Gingles brought suit when North Carolina enacted a 
redistricting plan for its state legislature. 17 The new plan included anum-
ber of multimember districts, 18 which Plaintiffs claimed diluted black 
II. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) 
12. See id. at 50-51. 
13. 160 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1998). 
14. 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993). 
15. See Gingles 478 U.S. at 51. 
16. See id. at 68-70. 83, 101. 
17. See id. at 34-35. 
18. See id. at 46-51. Multimember districts are electoral districts which combine the area of 
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votes by placing concentrations of black voters who would constitute a 
majority in a single-member district into multimember districts with a 
majority of white voters. 19 Plaintiffs asserted that such a system violated 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 20 
The Court noted that Congress' amendment to Section 2 requires 
only a "results test" as the standard for proving a violation. 21 Thus, under 
the amendment, a discriminatory effect alone is enough for a violation; 
there need be no intention on the part of officials to implement a dis-
criminatory election system.22 The Court also recognized that the Senate 
listed several factors that it wanted to be considered when looking at a 
possible Section 2 violation. 23 The factors were: 1) a history of official 
discrimination within the area that affected minorities' voting rights; 2) 
the extent of racial polarization within the area; 3) a history of using de-
vices such as unusually large electoral districts, majority vote require-
ments, anti-single shot voting, and other methods to encourage discrimi-
nation; 4) a candidate slating process to which members of minority 
groups have been denied access; 5) the effect of past discrimination of a 
minority group which affects education, employment, health, etc. which 
in tum affects ability to participate in the political process; 6) whether 
subtle or overt racial appeals are used in political campaigns; 7) the ac-
tual electoral success of members of a minority group; and 8) other fac-
tors, such as a significant unresponsiveness to minority community con-
cerns by elected officials and a tenuous policy underlying any particular 
. d . 24 
votmg proce ure or practlce. 
The District Court had considered many of these factors while look-
ing at the alleged violation?5 The Supreme Court, while upholding gen-
erally the district court's findings, synthesized the factors into a three 
prong test. The Court was careful to state that multimember districts are 
not per se violations of Section 2?6 Plaintiffs in a Section 2 action still 
several single-member districts (where just one official is elected in the district) so that several offi-
cials are elected from that district. This is mostly done with school board districts and city council 
districts. In multimember districts, each voter usually has the same number of votes as seats avail-
able; therefore, if there are two open seats, each voter could vote for two separate candidates in the 
field. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. at 39. 
21. See id. at 36. The statute reads, in relevant part, "No voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a mnnner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United Sates to vote on account of race or color, .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added). 
22. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36. 
23. See id. at 36-37. 
24. SeeS. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982). 
25. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37-38. 
26. See id. at 48. 
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must prove that the multimember election system significantly affects 
their ability to elect their representatives of choice.27 In order to do so, 
plaintiffs have to satisfy three conditions.28 
First, plaintiffs must show that the minority group "is sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single 
member district."29 This requirement makes sense because if the minority 
could not elect a representative of its choice in a single-member district, 
then it is not the multimember election system that is diluting the minor-
ity vote, and thus there is no structural remedy.30 Second, the plaintiffs 
must show that the minority group "is politically cohesive."31 If the mi-
nority group is not politically cohesive, then there are no distinctive mi-
nority interests which are not being served by a multimember district.32 
Third, the plaintiffs must show that the majority "votes sufficiently as a 
bloc to enable it ... to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."33 This 
requirement allows the minority to show that being subsumed within a 
larger majority impedes its ability to elect its candidate of choice.34 
This test incorporates two of the Senate factors, which the Court 
characterized as the most important: the ability of members of the minor-
ity group to be elected within the jurisdiction, and the extent of racial po-
larization within the jurisdiction.35 The other factors, the Court said, sup-
port a vote dilution claim, but are not essential to it.36 
There were two concurring opinions in Gingles. The issue on which 
they differed from the minority was whether the race of the candidate 
should be considered when determining who can be considered the mi-
nority's preferred candidate.37 This lack of agreement on the part of the 
Supreme Court led to confusion among circuit courts over the proper 
definition of minority-preferred candidate. Furthermore, although the 
Court discussed whether the race of the candidate is relevant, it never 
explicitly adopted any test to determine the "minority-preferred candi-
date." 
Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, which was only a plurality 
for this part, stated that the candidate's race should not be a consideration 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 50-51. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. /d. 
34. See id. at 51. 
35. See id. at 48 n.l5. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 83, 10 I. 
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in a Section 2 claim; rather, it is the race of the voters which is important 
(since they will need to show political cohesion and a representative of 
choice). 38 Therefore, the "minority-preferred candidate" can either be a 
member of a minority or the majority. He stated two reasons to support 
his opinion. First, if Congress had intended only minority members to be 
minority-preferred candidates, it would have specified that. 39 As it is, 
Congress only mentioned "representatives of their choice," which Justice 
Brennan interpreted on its face. 40 Second, the goal of the Voting Rights 
Act is only to ensure that the majority does not impede the minority's 
electoral opportunity, which goal can be achieved by looking only at the 
minority's race and the votes cast by the minority.41 
Justice White took issue with Justice Brennan's approach to "minor-
ity-preferred candidate" because Brennan's approach seemed unable to 
separate race-based politics from interest-group politics.42 Justice White 
gave an example to illustrate his point.43 Suppose that there exists a mul-
timember district with eight members.44 The district is 60% white and 
40% black, and there could be two single-member districts drawn with a 
majority of black voters.45 There are six white and two black Republi-
cans running against six white and two black Democrats.46 Suppose fur-
ther that all of the Republicans, including the two black candidates, are 
elected, although 80% of the black voters voted Democratic.47 Under 
Justice Brennan's test, there would be a Section 2 violation: the minority 
could be a majority in at least one single-member district, the minority 
was politically cohesive (80% voted Democratic), and the minority was 
unable to elect its representatives of choice because of the majority's 
vote. However, Justice White pointed out that the real reason the minor-
ity's representatives of choice were not elected were because of party, 
1 . . 48 not race po anzatwn. 
Justice O'Connor agreed in part with Justice White, but she elabo-
rated more on her position than did Justice White.49 She stated that the 
race of the candidate is not necessarily irrelevant to an inquiry into ra-
38. See id. at 67-70. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. at 83. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 101. 
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dally-polarized voting.50 Evidence that majority voters voted against a 
minority-preferred candidate for reasons other than those which made 
that candidate minority-preferred could be evidence that another "minor-
ity-preferred candidate" may receive majority support.51 However, Jus-
tice O'Connor disagreed with Justice White's apparent position that a 
candidate's race was the only factor to be considered.52 She argued that 
both of the other approaches ignore several of the Senate Report factors, 
such as a lack of responsiveness by elected officials to minority con-
cerns, and that the more bright-line tests fail to adequately explore 
whether racial politics play a large role in the district. 53 
Not surprisingly, given the Supreme Court's disagreement, the cir-
cuit courts have disagreed over how to define "minority-preferred candi-
date." The various Circuits have fallen into two basic camps, although 
there are variations even among compatriot circuits. The Second, Fourth, 
and Sixth Circuits have applied an objective test similar to the approach 
advocated by Justice Brennan.54 These circuits looked solely at which 
candidates receive the most minority votes.55 The Third, Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits used a totality of circumstances analysis which re-
quires the court to delve into multiple factors in each case.56 This analy-
sis is closer to that suggested by Justice O'Connor. 
B. The Circuit Courts 
NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls57 is a good example of the bright-
line rule. In 1985, by referendum, the City of Niagara Falls changed its 
city government to include a seven-member city council whose members 
were elected at large.58 A majority of the voters specifically rejected a 
single-member district option. 59 Four years later, plaintiffs filed an action 
claiming that the at-large election system impermissibly diluted the Afri-
can-American vote in the district, violating Section 2 of the Voting 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 99. 
53. See id. at I 0 I. 
54. See NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1018 (2d Cir. 1995); Lewis v. Al-
mance County, 99 F.3d 600,614 (4th Cir. 1996); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 810 (6th 
Cir. 1994). 
55. See Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, !60 F.3d 543, 551 (9th Cir. 1998). 
56. See Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3'd 1993); 
Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 71 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1995); Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 
1303, 1321 (lOth Cir. 1996); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (lith Cir. 1994). 
57. 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995). 
58. See id. at 1004. 
59. See id. at 1005. 
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Rights Act.60 They asked the court to order a move to single-member dis-
tricts, one of which would be predominately African-American.61 The 
district court refused to do so, saying that the plaintiffs had failed to meet 
all the requirements of the Gingles test.62 The Second Circuit Court even-
tually affirmed the district court, and its definition of "minority-preferred 
candidate" was essential to its analysis. 63 
The Second Circuit expressly rejected the Third Circuit's multi-
factor test in favor of a more straight-forward and objective approach.64 
The Second Circuit's holding is specifically geared toward cases where 
plaintiffs want to change multimember districts into single-member dis-
tricts and can be broken down into three parts.65 First, a candidate cannot 
be the "minority-preferred candidate" if he or she has received less than 
50% of the minority vote.66 Second, even if a candidate receives more 
than 50% of the minority vote in the multimember general election, that 
candidate is not necessarily the minority-preferred candidate if another 
candidate received more minority support in the primary but failed to 
reach the general election.67 And third, a candidate does not have to be 
considered minority-preferred even with more than 50% of the minority 
vote if another candidate receives significantly more minority support.68 
Therefore, in each election, the court may designate more than one, or 
no, candidates as minority-preferred.69 
In Jenkins v. Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Educa-
tion,70 the Third Circuit took an entirely different approach to defining 
the term "minority-preferred candidate." The plaintiffs, who were black 
voters, alleged that the at-large system for electing the Board of Educa-
tion diluted the voting strength of black voters.71 Plaintiffs sought an in-
junction banning the at-large voting system and establishing a different, 
non-discriminatory system.72 The district court found that the plaintiffs 
had failed to satisfy the third prong of the Gingles test, that the majority 
votes as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's representative of choice.73 
60. See id. 
61. See id. at 1004. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 1018-19. 
64. See id. at 1018. 
65. See id. at 1018-19. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. 4 F. 3d II 03 (3'" 1993). 
71. See id. at 1111. 
72. See id. at 1111-12. 
73. See id. at 1112. 
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However, the Third Circuit found that the district court had erred in its 
analysis and reversed and remanded the case.74 Central to the Third Cir-
cuit's ruling was the third Gingles prong, which is where the concept of 
"minority-preferred candidate" comes into play. 
The Third Circuit rejected any approach which either gives all or no 
consideration to the race of the candidate?5 Underlying the flexible ap-
proach advocated by the Third Circuit are two considerations: 1) "not all 
minority candidates will be minority preferred," and 2) even if a majority 
candidate receives a majority of the minority's vote, an inquiry should be 
made into whether the majority candidate truly represents the interests of 
the minority.76 Despite its first consideration, the Third Circuit conceded 
that often a minority candidate will be the minority's preferred candidate, 
creating an inference that, while not meeting plaintiff's burden, it takes 
plaintiff partway to proving the minority-preferred candidate.77 The 
plaintiff then must introduce additional evidence to prove a particular 
candidate is minority-preferred, although the court stated that this burden 
is not substantial and may be satisfied by lay testimony or statistical 
I . f . 78 ana ys1s o votmg patterns. 
The Third Circuit then gives several factors for district courts to use 
when determining whether a candidate is minority-preferred. 79 One con-
sideration is "the extent to which the minority community can be said to 
have sponsored the candidate."80 Relevant factors here include minority 
involvement in advancing the candidate and the level in which minorities 
participate in conducting or financing the candidate's campaign.81 An-
other consideration is "the attention which the candidate gave to the par-
ticular needs and interests of the minority community."82 Within this in-
quiry, the court can look at whether the candidate campaigned in 
minority areas and addressed minority crowds.83 A further consideration 
is "the rates at which [minority] voters turned out when a minority can-
didate sought office as compared to elections involving only [majority] 
candidates."84 The final consideration the Third Circuit mentions is "the 
extent to which minority candidates have run for office and the ease or 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 1125. 
76. /d. at 1126. 
77. /d. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. at 1129. 
80. /d. 
81. See id. 
82. /d. 
83. See id. 
84. /d. 
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difficulty with which a minority candidate can qualify to run for of-
f . ,85 ICe. 
Most of the other circuits accept one of these two approaches, al-
though they each have their variations. The Supreme Court has not ac-
cepted any of these cases for review, and so remains silent--except for 
Gingles-as to the proper definition of a "minority-preferred candidate." 
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit heard a case which demanded it choose an ap-
proach for determining the "minority-preferred candidate." 
III. RUIZ AND THE OBJECTIVE TEST 
The Ninth Circuit joined with the reasoning of the Second, Fourth, 
and Sixth Circuits concerning the definition of "minority-preferred can-
didate" by accepting an objective, bright-line test.86 In Ruiz v. Santa 
Maria, 87 the plaintiffs, four Hispanic voters, claimed that the City's elec-
toral system diluted the Hispanic vote in violation of the Voting Rights 
Act.88 
A. The Factual Background of Ruiz 
The City of Santa Maria had always elected its mayor and city coun-
cil members in an at-large election system.89 The mayor was elected to a 
two-year term, and each of the council members were elected to four-
year terms, although their elections were staggered so two council mem-
bers are elected every two years.90 Voters would permitted to vote for up 
to two candidates in the city council elections.91 
The Hispanic population had grown in Santa Maria. In 1970, Hispan-
ics made up 27% of the city's population, and that percentage increased 
to 33% in 1980 and to 45.7% by 1990.92 Also in 1990, the population 
was 46.4% white, 1.9% black, and 5.9% Asian, Pacific Islander, or 
other.93 Even though they were nearly half the population, Hispanics 
comprised only 28.7% of the voting age population.94 Both political par-
ties agreed that the Hispanic population would continue to grow.95 
85. !d. 
86. See Ruiz v. Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9"' Cir. 1998). 
87. !d. 
88. See id. at 547. 
89. See id. at 546. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
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The plaintiffs presented election results that showed that until 1994, 
no Hispanic had ever been elected as a city official.96 Their results 
showed that even though the Hispanic candidates were the first or second 
preference of Hispanic voters, the Hispanic candidates were the least pre-
ferred candidates of the other voters and came in last in every election.97 
The only first or second preference of Hispanic voters who was elected 
was a white candidate, Urbanske, who ran in 1988 and 1992.98 The plain-
tiffs filed their first action in 1992, and the case first went to trial in 
1994.99 In the 1994 city elections, two Hispanic candidates (who were 
the first and second preference of Hispanic voters) were elected to the 
city council. 100 The district court dismissed the action in 1996, saying 
that the success of Hispanics to elect their preferred candidates rendered 
the case moot. 101 Alternatively, the district court stated in granting defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs could not prove that 
the majority voted as a block to defeat minority-preferred candidates, a 
necessary factor under the Voting Rights Act. 102 The Circuit Court dis-
agreed with both grounds for summary judgment and agreed to hear the 
103 
case. 
B. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning in Ruiz 
The Ninth Circuit faced the issue of whether the majority usually 
vote as a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate. Essential to 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 546-47. 
99. See id. at 547. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 547-48. 
I 02. See id. at 548. 
103. See id. at 548-49. Plaintiffs argued that the case was not moot because of "special cir-
cumstances" surrounding the 1994 election. Specifically, they pointed to 4 things: I) unprecendented 
crossover voting by non-Hispanics. The percentage of non-Hispanics voting for Hispanic candidates 
was very low in previous elections, and actually falling (15.7% in 1988, 8.6% in 1990, and 4.7% in 
1992), and Hispanic candidates had always been the least preferred candidates of non-Hispanics. 
However, the Hispanic candidates in 1994 received 35.2% and 26.1% of the non-Hispanic vote; 2) 
the Hispanic candidates in 1994 received endorsements from city organizations and leaders who had 
never before endorsed Hispanic candidates; 3) the Hispanic candidates in 1994 received much more 
money from non-Hispanic sources than Hispanic candidates in other years did. Also, one of the His-
panic candidates spent $32,000 of his own money, which was three times more than any other can-
didate had ever spent in a city council election; 4) the pending lawsuit filed by plaintiffs was well-
known throughout the city, and a newspaper article quoted a candidate urging the voters to prove 
that Santa Maria was not racist. The circuit court concluded that the case was not moot because the 
Voting Rights Act looks at whether a majority-bloc usually defeats a minority-preferred candidate, 
not whether the minority has ever been able to elect its preferred candidate. Therefore, it was still 
appropriate for the court to address the question of whether Santa Maria's election system violated 
Section 2. See id. at 548-49. 
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such an inquiry is the proper definition of "minority-preferred candi-
date." As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court did not clarify this 
issue in Gingles, and the circuit courts were split on it. Furthermore, this 
was the first time the Ninth Circuit was called upon to determine this is-
sue.104 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was free to decide what approach it 
deemed appropriate. 
The court of appeals first agreed with most of the other circuits that a 
non-minority may be the minority's preferred candidate. 105 This recog-
nizes that a non-minority candidate may best reflect and address the mi-
nority's concerns, while a minority candidate may not. It also avoids 
"electoral apartheid" which would be "a view inconsistent with our peo-
ple's aspirations for a multiracial and integrated constitutional democ-
racy."Jo6 
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the question of which candidate 
within a given election was the minority's preferred candidate. The Court 
recognized the opposing positions: the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits that looked at which candidate receives the most votes from minor-
ity voters, a bright-line, objective test, and the Third, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits that used a multi-factor test that looks at the totality of 
circumstances and anecdotal evidence to determine the minority pre-
ferred-candidate on a case-by-case basis. 107 The Ninth Circuit explicitly 
agreed with the Second Circuit's decision in Niagara Falls that a bright-
line test should be used. 108 
The Ninth Circuit gave two reasons why it preferred the objective 
test to the multi-factor, totality of circumstances test. First, the Ninth Cir-
cuit borrowed the Second Circuit's reasoning that the totality of circum-
stances test requires delving into anecdotal evidence, which is a "dubious 
judicial task" that can deteriorate into racial stereotyping.109 Specifically, 
inquiring into factors such as whether a candidate has addressed the mi-
nority community's concerns "suggest[s] the existence of a racial politi-
cal orthodoxy that courts should not legitimate."110 Second, the totality of 
circumstances approach "do[es] not necessarily bear a correlation with 
how all minority voters feel about a candidate, only how activist groups 
feel." 111 One of the factors that such an analysis considers is whether the 
I 04. See id. at 552. 
105. See id. 
106. /d. (quoting NAACP v. Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1016 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
107. See id. at 552. 
108. See id. 
109. /d. (quoting Niagara Falls, 65 F. 3d at 1018). 
110. Niaf?ara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1018. 
Ill. Ruiz, 160 F. 3d at 552. 
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minority group mobilized to support a particular candidate. 112 However, 
as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, "not all minorities may have the time or 
inclination to take such steps, even though they support that candi-
date."113 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ballot box was the 
best way to determine the minority-preferred candidate. 114 
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the Second Circuit's view that a 
candidate who receives the most minority votes in the general election 
does not have to be considered the minority's preferred candidate if the 
candidate receiving the most minority votes in a primary election is de-
feated in the primary and does not reach the general election. 115 This is 
logical, since in order to exercise their voting rights in a general election, 
minority voters must vote for the candidates who were victorious in the 
primaries, even if one of them was not originally preferred by minorities. 
Furthermore, the inquiry in a Section 2 action is whether the majority 
votes as a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate. The majority 
can do this just as effectively in a primary election as in a general elec-
tion. If this occurs, the minority should not be penalized for supporting a 
default candidate because the candidate the minority originally preferred 
was defeated early in the electoral process. 
The Ninth Circuit did break away from the Second Circuit's analysis 
by holding that the candidate who receives enough minority votes to win 
if the election was held solely among the minority group is the minority 
candidate.116 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that a candidate 
cannot be minority-preferred if he or she fails to garner 50% of the mi-
nority vote. 117 The Ninth Circuit points out that in election systems like 
the one in Santa Maria, in which there are several candidates and voters 
are permitted to vote for two candidates, few candidates ever receive 
more than 50% of the minority vote. 118 A requirement of 50%, then, 
would make it difficult to determine the minority-preferred candidate in 
most elections. 
N. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST IS THE BEST 
APPROACH 
While the Ninth Circuit in Ruiz adopted the objective test advocated 
by Justice Brennan and developed in Niagara Falls, the better approach 
112. See Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 4 F.3d I 103, 1129 (3'" 1993). 
113. Ruiz, 160 F. 3d at 552. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1018. 
118. See Ruiz, 160 F. 3d at 552. 
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would be the multi-factor, totality of circumstances test articulated by the 
Third Circuit in Jenkins. Even though such a test is more unwieldy and 
sacrifices some judicially economic advantages, it is more likely to give 
deserved attention to all evidence surrounding a Section 2 claim, leading 
to a more just result. 
A. The Criticisms of an Objective Test 
There are several criticisms of the objective approach. First, as the 
dissent pointed out in Ruiz, "the only virtue of the ... bright-line rule is 
simplicity ."119 While the objective approach may have some judicially 
economic advantages and makes it easier for an attorney to predict to a 
client who the court-determined "minority-preferred candidate" will be, 
it ignores the realities of Section 2 claims. Section 2 claims are necessar-
ily complex and fact-intensive anyway. Thus, removing one of the multi-
factor analyses conducted by the courts will not add to judicial economy 
but may significantly erode the justice of the outcome. Furthermore, al-
though the adopting Circuits touted the "bright-line" nature of the objec-
tive test, 120 they also recognized some of its limitations and volunteered 
to look into other factors. The Second Circuit, for instance, has stated 
that a court may ignore the fact that a candidate received more than 50% 
of the minority's vote and refuse to declare that candidate minority-
preferred if another candidate received greater minority support in the 
primary but did not reach the general election. 121 Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit allowed a court to discard its bright-line test in favor of a more sub-
jective approach. The Ninth Circuit agreed with these limitations and 
also added one of its own: a candidate does not have to receive more than 
50% of the minority vote in order to qualify as minority-preferred. 122 
Therefore, even the circuits who have adopted the bright-line test allow, 
and almost encourage, courts to make a more circumstances-based in-
quiry into which candidate is minority-preferred. 123 
A second criticism of the objective test is that it "fall[s] prey to the 
myopic presumption there is a minority preferred candidate in any race 
in which the minority votes." 124 A bright-line rule prohibits courts from 
looking at factors, such as the historical environment and the current 
choices, which may affect the minority's voting preference. 125 This may 
119. /d. at 561. 
120. See id. at 552. 
121. See Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1018-19. 
122. See Ruiz, 160 F. 3d at 552. 
123. Seeid. at561. 
124. Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1320 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
125. See Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 561. 
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lead the court to declare a candidate minority-preferred when that candi-
date was really only the minority's least disfavored candidate among a 
slate of disfavored candidates. 126 The response is that circuit courts using 
the bright-line rule have taken this edge off of their objective rule by 
permitting courts to look at other evidence and at candidate choices; 
based on such a survey, the courts may choose to declare no candidates 
minority-preferred. 127 However, this is simply a way of admitting that the 
circuits who use a multi-factor approach may be more likely to affect jus-
tice while not abandoning the bright-line rule. The more the courts tum 
to other factors to blunt the unyielding effect of the objective test, the 
more the advantages of a bright-line test are eroded and the advantages 
of the multi-factor test are accepted. 
Finally, a bright-line rule is dangerous because of its "unyielding ri-
gidity and insensitivity to the particular facts of a voting rights case."128 
The dissent in Ruiz is especially critical of the bright-line rule adopted in 
that case, since the rule did not even contain a percentage threshold to be 
met before a candidate can be declared minority-preferred as the Second 
Circuit did in Niagara Falls. 129 The Fourth Circuit, another proponent of 
the objective test, has also declined to set a threshold, but it requires an 
"individual assessment" that each candidate is actually minority-
preferred.130 Again, the circuits which adopted the objective test seem to 
recognize its limits, and engage in a fact-intensive, individual analysis of 
each case anyway. However, reliance on a bright-line test, with a quick 
comment that each case's circumstances may change the test, may actu-
ally be less bright-line for lower courts than a detailed multi-factor test 
such as the one used in Jenkins. 
B. Advantages of the Multi-Factor Test 
There are several advantages to a totality of circumstances, multi-
factor test like the one outlined in Jenkins. First, such a test allows for 
flexibility. 131 The multi-factor test rejects any per se rules that flow from 
the objective test. 132 A multi-factor test accepts all relevant evidence and 
allows the court to give the evidence the weight the circumstances deem 
126. See id. 
127. See Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1019. 
128. Ruiz, 160 F. 3d at 561. 
129. See id. 
130. See Lewis v. Almance County, 99 F.3d 600,614 (4th Cir. 1996). 
131. Seelenkins,4F.3dat 1125. 
132. See id. An example of such a rule is that elections involving only white candidates can 
never be relevant. See id. 
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appropriate. 133 This rule addresses Justice O'Connor's concerns that the 
objective test dismisses out-of-hand any circumstance where the race of 
the candidate may be relevant, and it does not adequately assess racial 
polarization and the interests behind it. 134 
Another advantage of a multi-factor test is that it is more likely to 
properly define the "minority-preferred candidate." The multi-factor test 
is consistent with Justice O'Connor's argument that majority candidates 
can be minority-preferred, 135 but provides an intensive inquiry to protect 
the validity of such a finding. 136 The objective test, especially where 
there is no minimum threshold of support or provision for individual as-
sessment, can elevate least-disfavored candidates to preferred status. 137 A 
test that requires the court to look into such factors as minority support 
for the campaign, the extent to which the candidate addressed minority 
concerns, the ability of minorities to mount viable campaigns and minor-
ity turnout in a particular race is more likely to identify a candidate who 
is truly minority-preferred. 138 Such a test would be better suited to iden-
tify a candidate who actually encouraged minority support from one who 
was merely grudgingly given minority support as the lesser of two 
evils. 139 
Advocates of the objective test can counter that the multi-factor test 
requires greater time and subjectivity from a court in order to delve into 
many fuzzy factors and a vast array of facts, only to often come out the 
same way as the much simpler objective test. Indeed, in straightforward 
cases, this may be true. However, more complex or marginal cases may 
be resolved very differently under the two separate tests. Consider the 
hypothetical of a district in which the majority controls the nomination 
process to such an extent that the minority can never even see a preferred 
candidate in a primary election. However, a bare minimum majority of 
the minority votes for the winning candidate in each election. Under an 
objective test, there would be no Section 2 violation, since the winning 
candidate would be considered to be the minority-preferred candidate. In 
fact, even the safeguards of the Second Circuit would fail to find a viola-
tion, since over 50% of the minority voted for the winning candidate and 
there was not a candidate in the primary who received more support. 
However, a multi-factor test could uncover the fact that minorities are 
133. See id. 
134. See Gin!(les, 478 U.S. at 101. 
135. See id. 
136. See Jenkins, 4 F. 3d at 1128. 
137. See Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 560-61. 
138. See Evelyn Elaine Shockley, Votin!( Rights Act Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and 
the Minority Community's Candidate of Choice, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1038, 1062 (1991). 
139. See id. 
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barred from affecting the nomination process, as well as consider 
whether the winning candidate ever addressed minority concerns, re-
ceived minority support other than votes, or encouraged minority tum-
out. Under this scenario, the multi-factor test is much more likely to im-
part justice, which should be a paramount concern over possible judicial 
economy or simplicity. 
A multi-factor test incorporates the idea of "civic inclusion" of mi-
norities.140 It is this theme that recent scholarship insists Congress in-
tended with its "opportunity ... to participate in the political process" 
language. 141 Civic inclusiveness engages minorities in all stages of the 
political process- from lobbying to talking to representatives to forming 
coalitions to nominating and slating candidates.142 Because of its pres-
ence in the Voting Rights Act, civic inclusion should be part of a Section 
2 analysis. 143 A totality of circumstances test incorporates several of the 
factors that define civic inclusiveness. Thus, a multi-factor test recog-
nizes the importance Congress placed on the whole political process (not 
just a voting ballot) when determining whether minorities were being 
discriminated against electorally. Civic inclusion also has a real bearing 
on which candidates are minority-preferred, since the ability of minori-
ties to affect the early stages of the political process (nomination, etc.) 
will affect their level of support for candidates who make the ballot. If 
minorities are shut out from the political process, it is likely that none of 
the resulting candidates will truly be minority-preferred. 
Finally, the legislative intent of the amended Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act supports a multi-factor test. Congress amended Section 2 ex-
plicitly to reject an "intent" test and move to a "results" test. 144 The Sen-
ate also included a report that outlined relevant factors in determining 
whether minorities have been denied the opportunity to elect their repre-
sentatives of choice.145 As the majority opinion noted in Gingles, two of 
these factors were incorporated into the three prong test. 146 However, the 
other Senate factors were not specifically included in the test; the only 
way to completely effectuate the legislative intent of the Senate is to in-
corporate these factors into the determination of the minority's preferred 
candidate. This incorporation would still allow these factors to affect the 
140. See id. at 1059-61. 
141. See id. at 1059. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 1060. 
144. See Gingles, 478 U.S. 35-37. 
145. SeeS. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29. 
146. See Gingles, 478 U.S. 48 n 15. 
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3-prong test, since who the minority's preferred candidate turns out to be 
can greatly affect whether or not there has been a Section 2 violation. 
Several of the factors Jenkins looks to in its multi-factor test incorpo-
rate various Senate factors and ensure that those factors influence the 
evaluation of a vote-dilution claim. First, the Jenkins requirement that the 
court look to the attention a candidate has paid to the minority commu-
nity and its interests147 relates to the Senate's interest in whether elected 
officials are responsive to the minority community's needs. 148 This is 
also a factor that Justice O'Connor asserted was missing from Justice 
Brennan's bright -line analysis. 149 It is difficult to consider elected offi-
cials to have been minority-preferred if the officials ignore the concerns 
of the minority community. Also, the Jenkins test looks at the extent to 
which minority candidates have run for office and any barriers which 
may hinder a minority's campaign. 150 Several Senate factors are included 
within this analysis including any history of discrimination in the juris-
diction, whether minorities have been denied access to a candidate slat-
ing process, and whether minorities bear effects of past discrimination 
which affect their ability to be involved in the political process. 151 
Furthermore, the language of the statute suggests that Congress in-
tended courts to consider many more factors and circumstances than just 
the minority's vote. Congress specifically stated that any determination 
of vote dilution should be "based on the totality of circumstances."152 
Congress even provided a list of factors which could be probative of such 
a determination, as mentioned above. 153 Such language demonstrates 
Congress' intent that the court's inquiry in a Section 2 claim to be 
searching and fact-intensive. The multi-factor, totality of circumstances 
approach is better suited to this intention than the bright-line test. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the multi-factor approach the Third Circuit adopted is a 
more appropriate inquiry into the "minority-preferred candidate" under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act than an objective test. The most obvi-
ous advantage of the objective test, its simplicity, does not stand up to 
the advantages of the multi-factor test. The Jenkins test is more likely to 
effectuate justice through its flexibility and greater likelihood of cor-
147. See Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1128. 
148. SeeS. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29. 
149. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 101. 
150. See Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1129. 
151. SeeS.REP.N0.97-417,at28-29. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). 
153. SeeS. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29. 
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rectly determining the minority-preferred candidate, and it more closely 
fits the legislative intent of Congress. Furthermore, followers of the 
bright-line test, in order to prevent it from being too rigid and insensitive, 
have modified it to include the opportunity for courts to consider other 
factors. While such modification has solved the problem, it has eroded 
the objective test's bright-line advantage. 
The objective test in Ruiz is especially harsh since it does not contain 
the softening elements of some of the other circuit court rules. The Ninth 
Circuit does not protect the minority from being assigned a least disfa-
vored candidate by establishing a minimum vote threshold, nor does it 
allow courts to conduct a fact-based assessment into a determined minor-
ity-preferred candidate. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit should have 
adopted the multi-factor test. 
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